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Abstract 
 
This is the first of two articles that considers the medical planning implications of 
large scale defensive military operations. This paper considers the military context 
and planning factors that may require a medical plan that is different from that seen 
in recent counterinsurgency operations. The scale and complexity of the challenge is 
likely to require a greater level of decentralisation and a more sophisticated 
approach to medical planning at the strategic and operational levels. 
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Introduction 
 
The Operational Patient Care Pathway (1, OPCP) was designed as a clinically 
orientated conceptual model for the functional capabilities that provide clinical care to 
operational patients from point of injury through to completion of Role 4 care. This 
was based on the clinical innovations in the care of patients from military operations 
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in Iraq and Afghanistan (2) and was converted into organisational structures through 
creation of the graphic that describes HSS to the joint operational area (3).  To date, 
the OPCP has been applied successfully in diverse deliberate operations (Op 
GRITROCK – UK contribution to Ebola response in Sierra Leone and Op TRENTON 
– UK contribution to UN operations in South Sudan) and has underpinned health 
service support (HSS) planning for small-and medium- scale contingency (4).  
 
Inter-state conflict has returned as a threat to UK national security (5). The 
Modernising Defence Programme is focused on regenerating and refining UK’s 
capability to conduct wargfighting at scale (WF@S). Therefore it is time for us to 
consider how the OPCP is to be applied to large-scale, high intensity warfighting 
operations against a peer adversary, whilst retaining the adaptability to 
accommodate operations across the spectrum of conflict. During the Cold War, the 
UK casualty estimates for a possible European conflict against the Warsaw Pact 
were 32,000 surgical casualties, 7500 combat stress casualties, 15000 chemical 
casualties over an eight day period, with 4,000 casualties per day arriving at the UK.  
This paper reviews some of the approaches to HSS planning to meet the Cold War 
demand and considers how these might be relevant once again. 
 
The Military Context 
 
The distinction between peace and war has become less distinct with confrontation 
between states and with non-state actors becoming more prevalent. Both parties are 
likely to use diplomatic, information and economic activities to achieve security 
objectives alongside the threat or actual use of military capability. The objectives of 
confrontation are more likely to be based on influence behaviours of the target rather 
than actual control of new territory.  Within this strategic context, the UK will need to 
be capable of applying, and defending against, Integrated Action at all levels of 
military operations.  It is highly likely that adversaries will use disinformation, denial 
of communication and the electromagnetic spectrum and internal insurrection as 
means to wage confrontation alongside any conventional use of military forces; 
moreover it is increasingly possible that CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological or 
nuclear) and/or novel weapon systems will be employed for operational advantage.  
At the tactical level, the UK will need to be capable of conducting dispersed, high-
tempo operations in complex terrain; in particular rapid transition phases, massing of 
joint fires against fleeting targets of opportunity and generating uncertainty by 
operating outside of doctrinal norms will all be critical to success against a peer 
adversary.  Within this, the urban environment is likely to be a major battlefield, with 
state adversaries able to deny movement through the use of anti-access and area 
denial weapons (including mines and novel ballistic weapons). It is also possible that 
there will be less protection of civilians and health personnel as a result of 
adversaries operating without the constraints of the Laws of Armed Conflict or 
International Humanitarian Law (6). All of these factors require HSS for confrontation 
and conflict to adapt from our recent experiences of counter-insurgency operations 
and to refresh our approach to the OPCP (7). 
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Planning Factors 
 
Scheme of manoeuvre.  Medical capability in the Cold War era was designed 
around a very simple and highly prescriptive scheme of manoeuvre (often referred to 
as the “linear” patient pathway).  This was the plan for the very specific scenario of a 
high intensity, short duration, corps level battle against a numerically superior enemy 
producing a very high volume of casualties. The ground over which this was to be 
fought was well known. This approach provided a very robust, high capacity/low 
capability healthcare system that could continue to operate despite limited 
communications and poor situational awareness available at the time.  Looking 
forward, this prescriptive Cold War approach retains relevance as a reversionary 
mode, but it fails to provide the agility of HSS capability required to enable the 
tactical activity that is critical to success against a peer adversary.  The modern 
approach to HSS to WF@S will require a more nuanced approach, based on 
inherently agile capability building blocks that can transition rapidly and seamlessly 
between tactical actions.    
 
Casualty Estimation and the Medical Planning Guideline. The Casualty Estimate 
is the most important planning factor for HSS. The principles around casualty 
estimation have been covered in a previous paper in this journal (8). It will be 
important to agree the methodology for casualty estimation with the operational 
planning community because the potential number of casualties in these scenarios 
will be substantially more than those experienced during the recent counter-
insurgency campaigns. The data used during the Cold War based on evidence from 
the Second World War may be an appropriate reference point, however there will 
also be data from recent battles from conflicts in Ukraine, Iraq and Syria that could 
provide a more contemporary analysis. It will also be necessary to consider civilian 
casualties within the casualty estimation process as it will be necessary to consider 
how their needs for HSS will be met. The 10-1-2(2)+2 Medical Planning Guideline is 
the guideline for the location of medical capabilities by time in the OPCP. It is 
possible that this will not be achievable in the threat environment and medevac 
distances of high intensity operations. Medical planners will need to be adept at 
articulating relative clinical risk to better Command decision-making; whilst clinicial 
personnel may need to adapt clinical practise to sustain patients who cannot be 
moved within this guideline. This is the essence of the concepts behind prolonged 
field and hospital care. 
 
Medical Evacuation.  During the Cold War all movement between point of injury 
and the forward hospital complex was conducted by ground based ambulances, with 
onward medevac to the rear hospital complex being conducted by rail or air. Overall 
this was primarily a ‘Ground’ medevac system. Medical evacuation in counter-
insurgency operations has been discussed in a previous paper in this Journal (9) 
Nearly all casualties were collected by Forward Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) 
from/near the point of injury, with ground medevac relegated to a contingency plan 
where aeromedical evacuation was not available; this was primarily an integrated 
‘Air’ medevac system. In both these scenarios, the severity of casualties dictated the 
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relative speed of movement through a single patient pathway. Looking forward, the 
balance in demand and supply of Forward AE is likely to be complex and highly 
dynamic.  In particular, in WF@S, the use of limited Forward AE capacity may be 
apportioned by tactical priority rather than purely on the basis of clinical need. 
Hence, a large-scale operation is likely to involve a complex and dynamic blend of 
concurrent “Air and Ground” medevac that varies in time and space. The 
type/severity/volume of casualties will determine the route of OPCP for each patient 
across the network of medical facilities in a theatre of operations.  This is 
fundamentally different from the Cold War and will be extremely challenging for the 
Patient Evacuation Control Centre who will require high levels of situational 
awareness and access to patient information to inform casualty regulation. The utility 
of unprotected battlefield ambulances is likely to be extremely limited and the system 
will be a reliant on protected ambulances, capable of supporting the full spectrum of 
casualties over long distances.  Moreover, in high threat areas, medevac may have 
to be a tactical combat task in order to ensure sufficient protection for the casualties 
during transit. To generate the capacity required, it will be necessary to consider how 
to co-opt civilian ambulances into the military medical evacuation system and 
possibly to rejuvenate relationships with the UK Voluntary Aid Societies that proved 
to be an effective augmentation to the formal military medical system in the First and 
Second World Wars (10). It may also be necessary to adapt civilian mass transit 
systems for the movement of high volumes of casualties including coaches, railway 
stock, wide-body aircraft and passenger liners. UK casualties may have to transit 
through several countries as part of their evacuation journey and this is likely to 
require mechanisms for co-ordination with the medical services of their host nations. 
 
Hospitalisation. Since the end of the Cold War, UK Field Hospitals have evolved 
into a generic, scalable, low capacity/high capability configuration, specifically 
designed to support the requirements of small- and medium- scale contingent 
military operations.  Moreover, to date, application of the OPCP has included an 
option of STRATEVAC direct from “Forward” deployed hospital care. In large-scale 
operations, it is likely that patients will need to be cleared from the forward hospitals 
in the theatre of operations because STRATEVAC will have to be conducted further 
away from battlefield because of the threat to military airfields. It may be necessary 
to separately designate the functions of military hospitals as tactical ’Field Hospitals’ 
and relatively static Force Support Hospitals with higher capacity and specialist 
clinical capability, similar to the medical organisation for the world wars and the Cold 
War (11). This designation balances mobility, capacity and clinical capability for our 
deployable hospital structures. 
 
Coalition and Host Nation Medical Planning. It will be inevitable that HSS in a 
large-scale military operation will be part of a coalition operation, probably within a 
formal Alliance such as NATO. It is probable that the military forces of the host 
nation will be part of the coalition (12). The host nation civilian medical system will be 
actively involved in medical planning for civilian casualties and may also have a role 
in the care of military casualties. International bodies non-government organisations 
may also contribute to the medical effort (13). Therefore it will be necessary to plan 
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at theatre level with all HSS partners and allocate staff to the liaison and co-
ordination functions necessary to achieve the best level of interoperability and 
efficiency in the use of medical resources within the Theatre. The same will apply for 
the reception and distribution of casualties within the UK and this will follow 
guidelines set out in the UK emergency planning, resilience and response 
frameworks (14).   
 
Triage versus MASCAL. It was recognised during the Cold War that, in the event of 
very large numbers of casualties, triage prioritisation would have to shift from 
attending to the sickest patients first to attending to those with greatest capacity to 
benefit first. The decision to adjust triage prioritisation was termed ‘Mass Casualty or 
MASCAL’ and changed the coding system from a ‘P’ system to a ‘T’ system and 
introduced an additional triage category ‘T4 – expectant’. This nuance has been lost 
and the ‘T’ nomenclature has become the universally adopted triage system by 
clinical necessity and ‘T4’ is used incorrectly to cover the deceased. Moreover, since 
the end of the Cold War, in NATO Doctrine ‘MASCAL’ has become synonymous with 
a ‘medical major incident’ (which requires mobilisation of “extra-ordinary resources”, 
but does not automatically necessitate use of the T4 expectant category (15)). It may 
be necessary to formally re-introduce the former MASCAL concept and revise the 
method of communication in order to re-introduce the procedural mechanisms that 
explicitly change clinical practice to husband medical resources to focus on 
benefitting the maximum number of casualties. Perhaps this might be a ‘M’ system 
denoting MASCAL. 
 
Medical Reserve. Since the Cold War, the medical plan has been specifically 
tailored to provide defined coverage for an area of military operations. The lack of 
surge capacity has been mitigated by the introduction of ‘medical rules of eligibility’ 
to control access to the military HSS system and the assumption that the pace of 
military operations could be adjusted to the capacity of the medical system.  In high 
tempo, high intensity peer-to-peer conflict such a tactical and operational constraint 
will be unacceptable. Therefore it will be necessary to explicitly define uncommitted 
strategic, operational and tactical medical reserves that can be assigned to respond 
to unexpected casualty flows. This will be most important at a tactical level where 
fluctuations in demand will have the greatest effect.     
 
Mobilisation. The deployed component of the Defence Medical Services are 
designed to be a combination of Regular and Reserve personnel. This 
acknowledges the relatively low level of clinical workload from trauma during 
peacetime but the substantial increase in demand during military operations. The 
Reserve component is designed to provide this augmentation. Additionally, it may be 
necessary to mobilise the Regular Reserve (the group of Service personnel with 
residual liability for mobilisation after early retirement from Regular Service). Whilst 
the total number of Reserves employed by the NHS is a very small proportion of the 
total workforce, there will be an impact on NHS clinical performance if large numbers 
are mobilised. Therefore it will be necessary to establish co-ordination of not just 
medical reserves through the NHS system but also to ensure that the correct 
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balance of choice is taken over the use of the national medical workforce in support 
of military operations alongside routine clinical services and any residual capacity 
needed to respond to military threats to the national homeland. This was exactly the 
balance that occurred during the World Wars with the establishment of a strategic 
medical manpower planning group, the Central Medical War Committee (16). 
 
‘Role 4’. The UK NHS will be the receiving clinical capability for UK military 
casualties returning from overseas. This system was highly effective in maintaining 
clinical care through Queen Elizabeth Hospital in Birmingham during the relatively 
low demand of Op HERRICK. With the UK casualty estimates of high intensity 
warfighting operations against a peer adversary, it will be necessary to distribute 
military casualties to a wider group of hospitals across the NHS for higher volumes of 
casualties including establishing a footprint of military support cells for military 
patients within these hospitals. This will be co-ordinated using NHS Emergency 
Planning, Resilience and Response (EPRR) system. This will be very similar to the 
mechanisms for civil-military co-ordination during World War 1 and 2. 
 
Medical C2.  Over the past 20 years the decentralised medical C2 model used in the 
Cold War evolved into a highly centralised model in which medevac was controlled 
directly by a 2* headquarters and difficult clinical decisions we were referred to a 
Deployed Medical Director.  This centralisation was entirely appropriate given the 
tactical context and was a key factor in the improvements in patient care. However 
the volume, complexity and tempo of decisions that will be an enduring character of 
a high intensity operation will force us to revert to a decentralised medical C2 model.  
However, in doing so, this does not mean simply reverting to a Cold War model as 
there are three fundamental differences.  Firstly, the agility in HSS capability required 
to support a future large-scale conflict will in itself drive a paradigm shift in medical 
C2 that will be particularly pronounced at battlegroup level. For example, during the 
Cold War the fixed construct meant that battlegroup medical planning was restricted 
to “where?” to place the UAP/Med Sect; now with Pre-Hospital Treatment Teams 
(PHTTs) designed to adopt multiple configurations, battlegroup medical planners 
must consider “how and where?” to place multiple PHTTs.  The second area of 
fundamental change is in the clearance of casualties from the rear of a battlegroup.  
In the Cold War, the Medical Regiment both regulated and controlled the movement 
of ambulances along secured lines of communication.  Now, in an era when lines of 
communication are contested, Medical Regiments will continue to provide regulatory 
advice, but the movement of ambulances must be controlled by the battlespace 
owner.  One cannot happen without the other, therefore medical operations teams 
will need to be fully integrated into battlespace owning headquarters. The third 
difference will be the requirement for coalition co-ordination at the theatre level 
including the need to understand the impact of military operations on the civilian 
health system. This will require substantially greater numbers of medical liaison cells 
including across the NHS. 
 
Conclusion 
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This paper has considered how we need to consider how lessons from medical 
planning in the Cold War need to be combined with modern concepts for medical 
support planning based on lessons from recent counterinsurgency operations. The 
second paper in this series will unify these ideas into a Theatre Level HSS concept 
and re-introduce the ideas of 4 phases in the medical evacuation of a casualty: 
collection, hospitalisation, evacuation and reception. 
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